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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
In assuming the role of a shareholder in a company, a person undertakes to be bound by the decisions of the 
majority for those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at in accordance with the law, even where 
they adversely affect the rights of the shareholders.1 The principle of the supremacy of the majority is essential 
to the proper function of companies.2  
Reliance is placed upon the principle of majority in order to achieve optimum success in the corporate 
governance of a company by having it function as a uniform entity. At times the effect of such then becomes 
the minority being prejudiced by the decision undertaken by the majority. Previously the minority had not been 
offered any protection against such adverse decisions of the majority. Such decisions would tend to adversely 
affect the interests of the minority shareholder or those of the company.  
In an effort to provide protection for the interests of the minority shareholder which may be infringed by the 
decision of the majority, the legislature has sought to develop a statutory mechanism to assist the minority 
shareholder through the adoption of the oppression remedy into the South African company law. The minority 
shareholder has available to it now a protection mechanism which seeks to ensure that not only the interests 
of the shareholder but the interests of the company which may be negatively infringed upon by the decision of 
the majority are protected from such acts and considered in the decision-making process.  
South Africa’s first encounter with protection mechanism was through section 111 of the Companies Act 46 of 
1926 which made provision for the winding up of a company based on just and equitable grounds.3 Not only 
would section 111 prevent a company which would otherwise being conducted profitable from being wound 
up, it would also allow the shareholder to exit the company with a fair price being paid for their shares as 
opposed to the price that the shareholder would get during a forced sale of the assets once the company 
undergoes a compulsory liquidation.4  
It was in the previous Companies Act,5 where South African company law had its first official encounter with 
the oppression remedy. Accordingly, section 2526 created triggering mechanisms that would be relied upon in 
determining whether an act or omission was oppressive. This section will be discussed in further detail below. 
Presently the oppression remedy is regulated through section 163 of the new Companies Act.7  
1.2. Research Statement  
                                                     
1 Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 678. 
2 Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd (n 1) 678. 
3 Bader v Weston [1969] 1 All SA 269 (C) 277.  
4 Bader v Weston (n 3) 277. 
5 Companies Act 61 of 1963. 
6 n 5 above. 
7 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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In the application of section 163, under which circumstance can an entity or a person in the form of a director, 
shareholder and/or a related person approach the court for relief under the oppression remedy, as far as the 
definition of a related person has been defined in the Companies Act.8 This discussion shall be further 
supplemented by a discussion of De Klerk v Ferreira and Others9 case, which is the most recent case in which 
the courts had to deal with the related person under the oppression remedy.  
1.3. Methodology  
The aim of this minor dissertation is ultimately to provide an answer to the problem statement of underpinning 
the applicability of the oppression remedy by determining how the act has empowered the juristic person, 
directors, shareholders and, most importantly, the related person to bring an application to the court for a 
complaint of oppressive and/or prejudicial conduct to the applicant’s interests or the business of the company. 
In developing a methodology for undertaking this minor dissertation, the following mechanisms shall be 
employed:  
Undertaking a brief discussion pertaining to the protection mechanisms that have now been firmly entrenched 
in the Companies Act under part B of Chapter 7, as opposed to its predecessor. The protection mechanisms 
have been enacted to circumvent any behaviour that may be considered prejudicial to minority shareholders, 
who may not be able to correct such aforesaid prejudicial circumstances due to their minority shareholding in 
the company. This shall then be followed by a discussion pertaining to section 163, which makes provision for 
a shareholder remedy that provides relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct by a company.  
In determining the applicability of section 163, the thesis below shall consider the judgement of De Klerk v 
Ferreira10 case, which sought to determine the locus standi of a person, particularly a related person, to bring 
forth to the court an application under section 163. The judgement of this case divulged into the meaning of a 
related person as defined in section 2 of the Companies Act, taking into consideration the notion of control 
underpinning the concept of related person between two juristic entities. The case further probed the 
circumstances where shareholders hold equal shares in an entity and reached a conclusion that the 
shareholder who exercises de facto control of the entity is deemed to have control as if he or she was a majority 
shareholder or member. Such judgement shall be explored in greater detail further below.  
In further considering the judgment and its impact on the application of section 163, this minor dissertation 
shall also include a brief review of the origin of the oppression remedy in South African law, its origin in the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926, as well as further developments that were made to the section in the Companies 
Act of 61 of 1963. In addition, it shall explore how the definition has been extended in the current Companies 
Act11 followed by a critical evaluation of the judgement, which envisages a detailed analysis of the definition of 
the word control regarding the determination of a “related person”.  
                                                     
8 n 7 above section 1. 
9 De Klerk v Ferreira (35391/14) [2017] ZAGPPHC. 
10 n 9 above. 
11 see n 7 above. 
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Lastly, this minor dissertation shall consider whether the court correctly applied the oppression remedy in 
reaching its judgement and whether the definition of related person in the context of the case was considered 
aptly by the judge. 
2. MINORITY PROTECTION MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS  
In an effort to offer protection to aggrieved shareholders, the Companies Act12 has introduced remedies in 
addition to retaining those that were already in existence in Chapter 7. Minority shareholders and other relevant 
stakeholders, such as employees have been offered improved protection, power and remedies under Chapter 
7 of the Companies Act, including the ability to bring class actions.  
The Companies Act has made a move towards the establishment of administrative bodies such as the 
Company Tribunal, Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) and the Take-Over Regulation 
Panel (TRP), all for the purpose of the effective enforcement of company law rather than enforcement by 
criminal prosecution. Locus standi to utilise the mechanisms provided under Chapter 7 is available to a person 
who can apply to the court, the Company Tribunal, CIPC and TRP; however, locus standi has also been 
extended to a person acting on behalf of those who cannot act in their own names, those acting as a member 
of, or in the interest of a group or class of affected persons, or an association acting in the interest of its 
members or, with the leave of the court, a person acting in the public interest.13  
The Companies Act has made provision for multiple avenues, which are routinely referred to as the general 
protection mechanisms made available to the disgruntled shareholder in order to oppose the decision 
undertaken by the majority of the shareholders. These methods of recourse include section 161 (Application 
to protect rights of securities holders), section 162 (Application to declare a director as a delinquent or put a 
director under probation), section 163 (Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate 
juristic personality of the company), section 164 (Dissenting shareholder appraisal rights) as well as section 
165 (Derivative actions). These methods shall be explored in further detail below.  
2.1. Section 161: Application to protect rights of securities holders 
A holder of issued securities may apply to court for a declaratory order regarding any rights of the securities 
holder in terms of the Companies Act, or the memorandum of incorporation of a company, or rules or any 
applicable debt instrument or an appropriate order to protect any such right, or to rectify any harm done to the 
securities holder by the company as a consequence of an act or omission that contravened the Companies 
Act, the memorandum of incorporation, rules or applicable debt instrument, or violated any right contemplated 
                                                     
12 see n 7 above. 
13 Piet Delport The New Companies Act Manual LexisNexis 110. 
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therein, or any of the directors to the extent that they are or may be held liable in terms of section 77 of the 
Companies Act. 14 
2.2. Section 162: Application to declare a director delinquent or under probation  
Accordingly a company, shareholder, director, company secretary or prescribed officer of a company, a 
registered trade union that represents employees of the company, or another representative of the employees 
of a company may apply to a court for an order declaring a person delinquent or under probation.  
2.3. Section 163: Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate juristic 
personality of a company 
Shareholders of a company may apply to a court to seek relief if they believe there has been conduct that they 
consider oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to them. Section 163 provides for circumstances where the act or 
omission spoken about has been undertaken by the company or a related person (person related to the 
company in question). 
The oppression remedy in both the old and the new Companies Act is expressed in very wide terms. In 
addition, the remedy that it provides is available to both minority and majority shareholders, for it is conceivable 
(though somewhat rare) that a minority can act "oppressively" toward a majority.  
Some writers, as well as the court in the case of Re Baltic real estate No 2 15 among others, hold the view that 
this remedy is one exclusive to minority shareholders due to the fact that majority shareholders have the ability 
to remedy any oppressive measure by way of exercising their majority vote or voting power.  
2.4. Section 164: Dissenting shareholders appraisal rights 
Once a company has given notice to shareholders of a meeting to consider adopting a resolution to amend its 
memorandum of incorporation by altering preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of any class of its 
shares, notice must be given to the shareholders of their rights and a dissenting shareholder may object to the 
proposed resolution by written notice at any time before the resolution is voted on.  
2.5. Section 165: Derivative actions 
A shareholder, or person entitled to be registered as a shareholder of the company or a related company, a 
director or a prescribed officer of the company or of a related company, or registered trade union that 
represents employees, or another representative of employees of the company, or any person who has been 
granted the leave (which may be granted only if the court is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so 
                                                     
14 see n 7 above.  
15 1993 BCLC 503. 
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to protect a legal right of that person) of the court to do so, may serve a demand upon a company to commence 
or continue legal proceedings, or take related steps to protect the legal interests of the company.16  
3. DE KLERK V FERREIRA AND OTHERS (35391/14) [2017] ZAGPPHC 
3.1. Facts as contained in paragraph 17 to paragraph 44 
As provided for in the methodology, a focal point of discussion in this dissertation will be the shareholder 
protection mechanism provided for under section 163, namely the relief of oppressive or prejudicial conduct 
by a company. It is important to consider De Klerk v Ferreira and Others17 case, as it explores the concept of 
applicability in relation to section 163. In determining the applicability of section 163, the case explores the 
definition of a related person with the underlying concept of control as a defining factor.  
In this matter, De Klerk was the Applicant and Ferreira the first Respondent. An application was brought to the 
North Gauteng High Court, by the Applicant, seeking redress by way of an order in terms of section 163 of the 
Companies Act and section 49 or section 36 of the Close Corporations Act,18 compelling the Respondent to 
transfer his interests in the corporate entities to the Applicant. The relationship between the two parties had 
been irretrievably broken down and there was no possibility of reconciliation.  
The Applicant and the first Respondent both held equal membership interests in Plantsaam Bestuurdienste 
CC (“Plantsaam”) and equal shares in Benjo Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd (“Benjo”). Benjo was the owner of a farm 
known as Portion 14 of the farm Vluytjeskraal in the Northern Cape Province (the “Farm”). The Applicant and 
the Respondent were the only directors and shareholders of both entities respectively. 19 
Initially, the Applicant put up the capital and held all the equity in Plantsaam and Benjo, thus making him the 
sole director and shareholder of both entities respectively. It was only years later that the Respondent acquired 
an equity in both Plantsaam and Benjo due to his contributions to the farming operations for both entities. 20 
A clause in the contract of employment entered into by the Applicant and the Respondent gave the Respondent 
an option to purchase fifty percent (50%) interest as a partner in the farming business against a payment of 
one rand (R1.00), but only once the farming operation had become profitable and the Applicant was first repaid 
the capital investment he had contributed to fund the establishment, the extension and operation of the farming 
enterprise. A series of agreements were then concluded between the parties, including a shareholders 
agreement. 21 
The Applicant required a winding up of both Plantsaam and Benjo, proceeded by a request for the Respondent 
to transfer his interest in Plantsaam and his shareholding in Benjo to the Applicant against payment of the 
amount representing the value of such membership interests held. The Applicant further contended that he 
                                                     
16 Delport (n 13) 110. 
17 see n 9 above. 
18 Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984.  
19 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 2. 
20 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 17. 
21 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 19. 
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was entitled to subtract from any amount so payable to the Respondent, an amount which should have been 
debited against the Respondent’s loan account in Plantsaam. 22 
The Respondent denied the redress sought by the Applicant and filed a counter claim, along with agreeing 
with the winding up of the two entities, stating that the Applicant should instead transfer his membership 
interests and shareholding in the two entities respectively to him.23 
In proving the applicability of section 163 to the court, the Applicant had to show the court that i) an act or 
omission undertaken by Benjo, or a related person (possibly the Respondent or Plantsaam), had resulted in 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial treatment towards him, ii) an act or omission undertaken by Benjo or a related 
person has unfairly disregarded his interests, iii) the business of Benjo or a related person is being or has been 
carried out or conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him, iv) the business of Benjo, 
or a person related to the company, is being or has been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to him, or v) the powers of a director of Benjo, or a person related to the company are being or have 
been exercised in a manner that unfairly disregards his interests.24 
Should it appear to the court that acts or omissions undertaken by the Respondent in relation to Plantsaam 
are unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable or that Plantsaam’s affairs have been conducted prejudicially, 
unjustly or inequitably, the court may make such order as it thinks fit, including an order compelling the sale of 
his membership interest, provided the court considers it just and equitable to do so.25 The onus on the Applicant 
applied mutatis mutandis to the Respondent under the counterclaim. 26  
Furthermore, the court recognised that section 163 confers on the court a wide discretion to compel a transfer 
of shares or interests in order to deal with prejudicial, oppressive, unjust and inequitable conduct by a company, 
director, shareholder or member against any other member etc.27 
In ascertaining whether the conduct complained of constitutes conduct that is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable, it is important to have a better understanding of the case by unpacking the facts thereof. This is 
most important in understanding how control of both entities was ultimately vested in the Respondent.28 
The Applicant relocated to practise as a medical doctor in Canada, leaving the day-to-day management of the 
farm in the Respondent’s authority. In addition to the daily management of the farm, the Respondent had the 
responsibility of ensuring that accurate books and financial records were kept in respect of both Plantsaam 
and Benjo, as well as retaining any such documents necessary for accounting purposes. 29 
                                                     
22 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 3. 
23 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 5. 
24 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 10. 
25 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 14. 
26 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 15. 
27 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 7 - 8. 
28 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 8. 
29 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 28. 
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The relationship of trust between the parties began to deteriorate in 2011, when the Respondent sought to 
defraud the Applicant by fabricating Plantsaam’s financial-making ability. The parties’ relationship further 
deteriorated to the point where they attempted to negotiate for a possible buy-out, to which both parties could 
not reach an agreement on. 30  
Detailed evidence was provided in court about the alleged irregularities in the bookkeeping and financial 
statements of Plantsaam, as undertaken by the Respondent. The purpose of the evidence was twofold: firstly, 
it was to establish that the affairs of Plantsaam had been conducted by the Respondent in a manner unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to the Applicant and, secondly, it aimed at setting the basis for determining 
the value of the loan account of the Respondent for the purposes of valuing Plantsaam and his interest in it. 31 
3.2. Judgement 
Upon reaching its decision, the court considered the application of section 163, with particular relevance to 
section 163 (2) which provides the court with a wide ambit of power to make any interim or final order it may 
consider fitting for the matter at hand, including an order directing an exchange of shares32 and an order to 
pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law entitling that person to compensation.33 
It appeared from the evidence presented to the court that the questionable conduct of the Respondent was 
mainly in relation to the affairs of Plantsaam, as none of these complaints related directly to Benjo. Herein lies 
the question of the definition of a related person as having been mentioned throughout this minor dissertation. 
34  
The court then had to consider the pertinent question of whether Plantsaam should be considered a person 
related to Benjo for the purposes of section 163. In proceeding with the application of section 163 under this 
case in particular, the court considered the definition of related person as contained in section 1 and 2 of the 
Companies Act. The court held that the determination of a related person will depend on whether the 
Respondent directly or indirectly controls the companies or their business, as provided in section 2(1)(c)(iii) 
and section 2(2)(d), by having the ability to materially influence the policy of the companies in a manner 
comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, would be able to exercise an element of control 
as contemplated in section 2(2)(a) to (c).35  
In adhering to the provisions of the Companies Act with regard to the meaning of a related person as contained 
in section 163, the court concluded that Plantsaam is a related person to Benjo as it could not have functioned 
and conducted its business without Benjo. The court further provided that the Respondent was able to 
materially influence the policy of Benjo, thus the business of Benjo was impacted negatively by the 
                                                     
30 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 30. 
31 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 45 - 71. 
32 (n 7) section 163(2)(e).  
33 (n 7) section 163(2)(j).  
34 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 73. 
35 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 72. 
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Respondent’s conduct while Plantsaam gained in profitability. 36 
The Respondent contended that no case had been made out in terms of section 163 of the Companies Act 
justifying the order sought by the Applicant, which included compelling the acquisition of the Respondent’s 
shares in Benjo. The Respondent contended that he is not a person related to Benjo as set out in section 
163(1) read with section 2 of the Companies Act, because the Respondent does not control Benjo as set out 
in section 2(2).37  
Furthermore, the Respondent held that the Applicant had failed to show that any act or omission undertaken 
by Benjo had a result that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarded the interests of the 
Applicant, nor was the business carried out or conducted by Benjo undertaken in a manner that was oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly disregarded the interests of the Applicant. Finally, the Respondent asserted 
that neither the powers of a director nor prescribed officer of Benjo were exercised in a manner that was 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarded the interests of the Applicant.38  
Upon conducting its judgement, the court held that the Respondent had interpreted section 163(1) of the 
Companies Act too narrowly. A shareholder is permitted to apply for relief under section 163(1) of the 
Companies Act if any act or omission of Benjo or a related person has a result that is oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interest of the Applicant. Alternatively, relief may be sought where the 
business of Benjo, or a related person has been carried out or conducted under a manner that is oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the interests of the Applicant.39  
In this case, the court held that the determination of locus standi will be sufficient if it can be proven that 
Plantsaam is a related person to Benjo and not necessarily the other way around. If Plantsaam is a related 
person, once it is established that the business of Plantsaam has been carried out in a manner that was unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the interests of the Applicant, that alone will permit an order directing an 
exchange of Benjo’s shares under section 163(2)(e) of the Companies Act.40 
In establishing the de facto control of one entity over another the court sought to place reliance on the definition 
of a related person as contained in section 2 of the Companies Act. Due to this case law development a 
discussion under section 163 pertaining to the oppression remedy in particular the determination of locus 
standi under this section shall ensure below with further a further discussion as to the developments as 
contained in other relevant cases pertaining to the oppression remedy.   
 
                                                     
36 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 74. 
37 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 74. 
38 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 74. 
39 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 74.  
40 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9) par 74. 
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4. THE OPPRESSION REMEDY  
The existence of minority shareholders’ remedies in company law serves to provide protection mechanisms 
for minority shareholders to protect and enforce their rights when they have reasonable grounds to believe that 
they have been violated by the directors or majority shareholders.41 Due to the exercise of the majority rule 
principle in the governance of companies, minority shareholders are prone to abuse by controlling 
shareholders.42 Company law attempts to drift away from the judicial non-intervention principle in corporate 
management by creating statutory means for judicial involvement in the exercise of majority rule by 
shareholders. Against this background, the oppression remedy emerges as an important legal mechanism to 
regulate the exercise of majority shareholder power in corporate governance. 43 
In the corporate governance of a company, the general rule is that when a dispute between shareholders 
arises, the majority must ultimately prevail. The principle of majority rule contributes towards the efficient 
management of the company.44 It is how most corporations have come to attain their success, however, there 
is an inherent tension between majority rule and protection of fundamental minority rights, 45 as the decisions 
normally taken by the majority are not always the most conducive for the interests of the company. As such, 
the Companies Act both old and new have made provision for a remedy to be made use of by the minority or 
the disgruntled shareholders who may be prejudiced by such aforesaid decision. The purpose of this remedy 
is to allow minority shareholders to seek redress from a court and a court as such may make an order that it 
deems fit. The aforementioned oppression is not only limited to directors of a company, shareholders are also 
at risk of oppression by the directors of a company.46 It may be noteworthy to mention that the courts have 
been granted a wide discretion in making a final or an interim order as contained in the new Companies Act. 
In the new Companies Act, the oppression remedy is provided for under section 163. This section is a statutory 
measure which can be invoked by an applicant, such applicant can be either a shareholder or a director in this 
instance, when the affairs of the company are conducted in a manner which unfairly prejudices or unfairly 
disregards the interests of the said applicant.47   
The origin of the oppression remedy is found in section 210 of the Britain Companies Act 1948 (UK). The 
oppression remedy was originally enacted as an alternative to winding up upon the establishment of a just and 
equitable ground. The first encounter with the reminiscence of something along the lines of the oppression 
remedy in South Africa was found under the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Herein the only remedy which an 
oppressed shareholder could seek was the winding-up of the company based on just and equitable grounds,48 
                                                     
41 Sibanda “Advancing the statutory remedy for unfair prejudice in South African company law: perspectives 
from international jurisprudence” 2015 SA Merc LJ Volume 27 No. 3 401 – 417.  
42 Sibanda (n 41) 401 - 417. 
43 Sibanda (n 41) 401 - 417. 
44 Lombard “Relief under section 16 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 – Unscrambling the omelet” WJC 
Swart University of South Africa 134. 
45 Taylor, McCosker, Tovey and Musson “Bermuda: Overcoming Majority Rule: The Minority Oppression 
Remedy In Bermuda” 27 July 2018. 
46 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2nd ed (2011) 758. 
47 Lombard (n 44) 134. 
48 Bader v Weston (n 3) 277. 
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which was similar to section 210 of the Companies Act of 1984 (UK). 
The oppression remedy, as it is today, appeared in our South African law in the Companies Act of 1973 under 
section 252. It is important in noting the development of the oppression remedy thus far to highlight how in 
accordance with the relevant section in the previous Companies Act 1926, the oppression remedy only made 
provision for a shareholder to seek redress through the winding up of the company based on just and equitable 
grounds.49  
According to section 252, a minority shareholder seeking judicial redress would have to prove that either the 
conduct complained of or that the affairs of the company was unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct. 
The remedy under section 252 was not as easily accessible to the minority shareholder, as they would have 
had to prove that the conduct taken by the majority was unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable towards them 
as the minority, whereas the scope has been broadened rather extensively under section 163 of the new 
Companies Act. One of the most noteworthy differences between the two sections being that the oppression 
remedy may now be utilised for conduct concerning the exercise of powers by directors or prescribed officers.50  
In line with Section 5(2) of the Companies Act, which provides for the consideration of foreign legislation by a 
South African court in interpreting or applying the aforementioned act, to the extent appropriate, the South 
African courts have been granted an unfettered discretion with regards to the application of section 163.  
In the application of the oppression remedy, the test for the oppressive conduct being complained of is one of 
unfairness, as opposed to unlawfulness. The conduct complained of may be unlawful without being unfair or 
unfair without being unlawful. Conduct may accordingly be “oppressive or prejudicial” within the meaning of 
the section, even where it does not violate any “rights” of the applicant, for instance, rights in terms of the 
Companies Act or the company's memorandum of incorporation.51  
The significance of section 163 lies in the changes it brings to the oppression remedy, which includes widening 
the scope of the remedy, expanding the discretion given to the courts in issuing an order and making the 
content of the remedy clearer relative to previous equivalent provisions,52 which further authorises the court to 
make such an order as it thinks fit.53 Section 163 was intended to have a wider scope of application than its 
predecessor 252, by making reference to an applicant’s “interests” instead of the term “rights”, as was 
previously contained in the previous section.54 This new insertion not only means that the court is to give a 
much wider interpretation of the section than its predecessor, but it also extends the use of the remedy to the 
directors whereas the previous section was only available for utilisation by shareholders.  
                                                     
49 see n 3 above. 
50 n 7 section 163(1). 
51 Cassim (n 46) 770. 
52 Lehloenya and Kagarabjang University of South Africa “Defining the limits of the ‘Oppression Remedy’ in 
the wake of section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 511. 
53 Lehloenya and Kagarabjang (n 52) 511. 
54 see n 3 above. 
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The authors of section 163 have further included “interests” in the provisions of the Companies Act in order to 
underline or emphasise the principle that the oppression remedy is not limited to the strict infringement of legal 
rights, but that it extends also to the protection of the interests of applicants.55  
In providing further improvements to the section, the South African legislature sought guidance from the 
oppression remedy under section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.56 The oppression remedy in 
Canada is considered to be one of the broadest and most comprehensive shareholder protection remedies in 
the common law, which has now been reflected in section 163 of the Companies Act.57 Delport briefly states 
that the existence of section 163 does not prevent a shareholder from utilising any remedy they may have 
available to them under common law.  
The oppression remedy may offer such protection without inevitably setting aside the decision undertaken by 
the majority.58  
What may be deduced from  De Klerk v Ferreira is even though section 163 is a minority shareholder protection 
mechanism, it may be made use of in bringing an application to the court for the acts of a minority shareholder 
who exercises de facto and not de jure majority control, which ultimately is considered prejudicial or unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of the applicant.   
Despite its now wide ambit and accessibility, section 163 however may not be used by a disgruntled 
shareholder in order to advance their own personal agenda. An example of where a minority shareholder 
cannot utilise the oppression remedy to advance their own personal agenda was established in the case of De 
Villiers v Kapela Holdings and Others,59 whereby a minority shareholder cannot establish unfairly prejudicial 
conduct where the majority offers to buy out the minority’s shares at a reasonable price.   
In this case the court held further that in order for an argument to be valid, it must of course presuppose the 
objectionable or otherwise unlawful conduct on the part of the majority.60 If it does not do such, and if the 
majority has been conducting itself lawfully, section 163 relief does not arise.61 
An applicant’s grievance can result from any of the following three instances: any act or omission of the 
company or related person, or the conduct or carrying on of the business of a company or related person, or 
the exercise of the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company or person related to the company. 
There are two important elements the applicant will need to consider in bringing fourth an application for judicial 
consideration: the conduct that resulted in the oppressive or unfairly prejudicial action, and the result and or 
consequence of the conduct.  
Unlike section 252, section 163 makes provision for a related person as well as a director of a company to 
                                                     
55 Cassim (n 46) 770. 
56 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. 
57 see n 7 above. 
58 Cassim (n 46) 757. 
59 De Villiers v Kapela Holdings and Others 42781/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 278. 
60 see (n 59) above.  
61 see (n 59) above. 
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apply to court for relief. This is key in that, such a director may have been nominated by the minority 
shareholder or shareholders, whereas the previous section only allowed shareholders to approach the court 
in seeking relief under the Companies Act.  
Further, unlike its predecessor section 252, section 163 prescribes no minimum period within which to bring 
an action. It is submitted that the basic requirements in respect of prescription should apply.62  
It is clear from section 163 that in order for an applicant to succeed, they need to prove to the court that the 
conduct being complained of is either oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the 
applicant. The conduct complained of need not be unlawful as long as the applicant can prove that it is 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the applicant’s interest.63 No legal rights of the 
shareholder need to be infringed upon by the company, but rather the interests of the shareholder must be 
unfairly disregarded.64 This remedy may not be utilised by a shareholder to advance their own personal agenda 
because they did not get their way at a shareholders’ meeting.  
The court will grant relief under the oppression remedy when, for instance, the majority shareholders use their 
“greater voting power unfairly in order to prejudice” a minority shareholder, or when they act in a manner which 
does not enable such a shareholder to enjoy a fair participation in the affairs of the company.65 The courts 
have also granted relief in the “standard case” of a quasi-partnership where shareholders have entered into 
an association on the understanding that each of them will participate in the management of the company, but 
the majority subsequently use their voting power to exclude a member from participation in management, 
without giving him or her the opportunity to withdraw his or her capital upon reasonable terms.66 
Despite the wide ambit of section 163, as mentioned above, it must be borne in mind that the conduct of the 
majority shareholders must be evaluated in light of the fundamental corporate law principle that, by becoming 
a shareholder, one undertakes to be bound by the decisions of the majority shareholders,67 therefore the 
conduct being complained of as unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable must be weighed against the principle 
of majority rule in order to truly establish whether such conduct should be considered unfairly prejudicial, unjust 
or inequitable.68  
4.1. Locus Standi   
A director, a prescribed officer or a shareholder may bring an application to the court under section 163. The 
remedy may only be utilised by directors, a prescribed officer or shareholders but not employees or creditors. 
A shareholder or a director of a company has locus standi in respect of oppressive or prejudicial conduct, 
                                                     
62 Off-Beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Share Block Ltd and Others [2016] 2 All SA 
704. 
63 Cassim (n 46) 757. 
64 (n 46) 759.  
65 (n 46) 770. 
66 (n 46) 770. 
67 (n 46) 771. 
68 Garden Province Investments v Aleph Pty) Ltd [1979] 1 All SA 248 (D) at 255. 
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whether by that company or by a person related to the company as contemplated in section 163(1)(a) – (c).69   
As previously mentioned, the new Companies Act has expanded the list of persons who have locus standi 
under the oppression remedy, as contrasted with its predecessor, which only extended the oppression remedy 
to shareholders to the exclusion of the directors, and the shareholders and directors of related persons.70 
Section 163 extended the right to seek relief under the oppression remedy to the directors, thus broadening 
the protection granted to minority shareholders to cover not only prejudicial conduct perpetrated by the 
company but also a related person. The definition of “related person” includes a variety of parties which the 
previous act of 1973 excluded,71 including a subsidiary and/or a holding company of the company, a spouse 
and a person living with the alleged wrongdoer in a relationship similar to marriage.72 
4.1.1. Shareholders as applicants  
Shareholders are defined as the holder of a share issued by a company and who is entered as such in the 
certificated or uncertificated securities register of such a company.73 A holder of securities other than shares, 
or a holder of debt instruments, clearly lacks locus standi under section 163.74 Only registered shareholders 
are eligible to bring an application under section 163. According to the Contemporary Company Law, this 
principle was firmly entrenched by the court in Lourenco v Ferela.75 
Even though the remedy is notably available to the minority shareholder, it should be mentioned that the 
remedy is available to any shareholder. Majority shareholders are not excluded from relying on section 163. 
Section 163 is available to any shareholder as long as they can prove the conduct complained of was 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial towards them. However, it is held that the majority shareholder may not be 
granted relief under this section, as the majority shareholder would have power at their discretion and would 
not necessarily be oppressed or be prejudiced as it may utilise its majority power to eliminate such oppression 
or prejudice. 
4.1.2. Directors as applicants  
Unlike in the previous act, directors now have the locus standi to bring an application under section 163.76 
Directors may bring an application for either oppressive or prejudicial conduct. The definition of a director 
includes a director being an alternate director as well as any person occupying the position of a director or 
                                                     
69 (n 46) 758. 
70 (n 52) 514. 
71 see n 3 above. 
72 see n 52 above. 
73 n 7 section 1. 
74 n 52 514. 
75 Lourenco v Ferela (Pty) Ltd 1998 3 SA 281 (T). 
76 see n 3 above. 
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alternate director, by whatever name that person may be designated.77 A de facto director would consequently 
appear to also be a director, as provided for by section 1 of the Companies Act.78  
4.2. Related Person  
As mentioned above, the right to bring forth an application has been extended to apply to directors and not 
only limited to the shareholders as it was previously. This new development means that the protection is not 
only available to the minority shareholders to cover not only prejudicial conduct perpetrated by the company, 
but also by a related person which now extends to parties that were not included in the previous section 252.79   
As was held in Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd, the extension of the locus standi to the inclusion of 
shareholders and directors of related persons constitutes a distinct improvement on the previous oppression 
remedy.80 Section 163 (1) (b) further states that the oppression remedy is applicable to prescribed officers. 
Section 1 of the Companies Act defines a prescribed officer as the holder of an office, within a company, that 
has been designated by the Minister (member of cabinet responsible for companies) in terms of section 66 
(11).81   
The definition of a related person is captured in section 1 of the Companies Act.82 It is noteworthy to consider 
the meaning of a related person in light of the discussion of the oppression remedy as applied in De Klerk v 
Ferreira. Section 163 (1b and 1c) makes specific reference to the business of a related person being carried 
out in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or if the powers of a person related to the company 
have been exercised in an unfair or prejudicial manner. Unlike its predecessor, section 163 has extended its 
ambit to include the conduct of a related person.  
Along with the definition, section 2 of the Companies Act provides for the criteria which determines whether 
an actual relationship exists between either the person or entity complained of and the applicant. The following 
definitions are to be taken into consideration when determining relatability within a relationship between a 
person and an entity or an entity and an entity:  
“A relationship includes the connection subsisting between any two or more persons who are related or inter-
related, as determined in accordance with section 2 of the Act;  
A related person when used in respect of two persons, means persons who are connected to one another in 
any manner contemplated in section 2(1)(a) to (c); and  
                                                     
77 n 7 section 1. 
78 Cassim (n 46) 760. 
79 see n 3 above. 
80 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) par 59. 
81 see n 7 above.  
82 see n 7 above.  
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Inter-related, when used in respect of three or more persons, means persons who are related to one another 
in a linked series of relationships, such that two of the persons are related in a manner contemplated in section 
2(1), and one of them is related to the third in any such a manner, and so forth in a unbroken series.” 
The definitions above as provided for in section 1 and 2 of the Companies Act are exhaustive and applicable 
for all purposes of the Companies Act.83 As mentioned above, an inter-related or related relationship can exist 
between two persons, a person and a juristic person and two juristic persons. As the dissertation is in essence 
about two juristic entities, it shall not divulge into the existence of a relationship between two persons.  
According to the Companies Act, a person is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly 
controls the juristic person; control is a term which shall be considered in further detail below. A juristic person 
is considered to be related to another juristic person if either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or 
the business of the other, either is a subsidiary of the other, or a person directly or indirectly controls each of 
them, or the business of each of them. 
It is clear from the paragraph above that the determination of the existence of relatedness or inter-relatedness 
is ultimately determinable by the exercise of control by one party over another. The importance of this case is 
that it draws attention to the element of control when it comes to establishing a relationship that is either related 
or inter-related between two entities or a person and an entity.84   
A shareholder by virtue of being a shareholder cannot be considered a related person unless that shareholder 
falls within the definition of a related person.85 The concept of a related person, includes a holding company 
and subsidiary relationship, as well as the direct or indirect “control” of another company or its business(or the 
direct or indirect “control” of each of them or the business of each of them by a third person).86 It may therefore 
be said that a person may qualify to bring about an application under this section as long as they are either a 
shareholder or director of the relevant company or of a juristic person related to the company.87 
The definition of control is provided for under section 2(2) of the Companies Act.88 The Companies Act 
distinguishes between three situations pertaining to the element of control in the Companies Act. A person is 
considered to be in control of a company or the business of a company when that person is the holding 
company of that company, or that person, together with any related or interrelated person is directly or indirectly 
able to exercise or control the exercise of a majority of the voting rights associated with securities of that 
company, whether pursuant to a shareholder agreement or otherwise, or has the right to appoint or elect or 
control the appointment or election of (not the power to remove) directors of that company who control a 
majority of the votes at a meeting of the board, and lastly, that person has the ability to materially influence the 
                                                     
83 see n 7 above.  
84 De Klerk v Ferreira case (n 9). 
85 Hennochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 574. 
86 Cassim (n 46) 761. 
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policy of the company in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, would be 
able to exercise an element of control referred to in the above two situations.  
According to the judgement of De Klerk vs Ferreira, the provisions of section 1 and 2 of the Companies Act 
include within the definition of a related person, juristic persons who are connected to one another in any 
manner contemplated in section 2(1)(a) to (c). Section 2(1)(c)(ii) holds that a juristic person, in this case Benjo 
is a related person with regard to Plantsaam if a person, the Respondent, directly or indirectly controls each 
of them, or the business of each of them, as determined in accordance with section 2(2) of the Companies 
Act.89  
Section 2(2)(d) provides that a person, the Respondent, controls a juristic person (Benjo and Plantsaam), or it 
its business if that first person, the Respondent, has the ability to materially influence the policy of Benjo and 
Plantsaam in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice would be able to exercise 
an element of control as contemplated in section 2(2)(a) to (c) of the Companies Act.90  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the situations referenced in section 2(2)(a) to (c) is that the controlling 
person is able to exercise the majority of votes in the controlled juristic person such as where the controlling 
person is a holding company, has a majority of the voting rights pursuant to a shareholder agreement or 
controls the appointment of directors with the majority of voting rights of the board, owns the majority of the 
members’ interest, or controls directly, or has the right to control, the majority of members, votes in a close 
corporation, or in the case of a trust has the ability to control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to 
appoint the majority of the trustees, or to appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust.91 
The provision, according to paragraph 80,92 takes the term control beyond its ordinary meaning under the 
corporate law principles of voting control. The purpose of this provision is to provide inter alia for circumstances 
where the controlling person perhaps does not have majority voting power but has an element of control 
comparable to that of a person who would.  
According to Delport, if the memorandum of incorporation or a valid shareholders’ agreement or the 
Companies Act provides for co-management in a company by the shareholders and/or directors, the usurping 
of these powers by a shareholder or director cannot be seen as the ability to exercise the element of control 
in the “majoritarian” situations as envisaged in section 2(a)(c). This “power” must be in terms of an agreement, 
express or otherwise, between the shareholder/s or even between the shareholders on the one hand and a 
third party on the other. Such powers, if given by the board, must comply with section 66. Further, this 
agreement is to comply with the memorandum of incorporation and the Companies Act.  
The ascertainment of control over an entity is determined by the circumstances of the particular case under 
review. The question then becomes a factual one.93 The case may envisage a situation where the controlling 
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person, a minority or equal shareholder has de facto control to materially influence the policy of the company, 
akin to a person who has de jure majority control. It is therefore possible for a person to control a juristic person 
despite not having de jure control or the majority of controlling votes in the company.94 Control is not only 
limited to the particular juristic person, but can also be extended to accommodate the respect of the business 
of the juristic person. 
In De Klerk v Ferreira, the court held that it was only necessary to prove that Plantsaam was a related person 
to Benjo and not the other way around. If after determining that Plantsaam is related to Benjo, and the conduct 
of Plantsaam had been undertaken in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests 
of the Applicant, the Applicant will then have proven to have locus standi to bring about an application to the 
court under section 163, seeking relief against Benjo in terms of section 163(1)(a) or (b). Therefore in 
determining the ability of the Respondent to materially influence the policy of Benjo and Plantsaam in a manner 
similar to that of a controlling shareholder, despite not being a controlling shareholder, we look to establish the 
level of control the Respondent had exercised over the aforesaid entities and conclude that Plantsaam is a 
person related to Benjo, because the one could not function without the other and both entities were under the 
control of the Respondent.   
Due to the author’s lack of clarity in the drafting of the phrase “ability to materially influence the policy of the 
juristic person”,95 the court in this case96 had to resort to giving the words their ordinary meanings. It has 
therefore been understood that the word policy meant the general plan or course of action that the company 
adopts and follows, whilst materially influence was believed to allude to the capacity or power to effect the 
development or execution of the policy substantially.  
4.3. Oppressive Conduct 
Accordingly, as mentioned above, there are only two main elements that an applicant must satisfy in order to 
obtain relief under section 163. Firstly, there must be conduct in the form of either an act or an omission 
undertaken by the business, or an exercise of powers by a director or prescribed officer of the company or a 
related person. Secondly, such conduct will need to be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the applicant by 
unfairly disregarding the interests of the applicant.  
Where an act or omission of the company or a related person has had a result that it is either oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial to the applicant or unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant, it is the actual result of 
the act or omission that must be unfairly prejudicial and not the act.97 It is not the motive for the conduct 
complained of that the court must examine but the conduct itself and the effect which it has on the other 
members of the company.98 However, as was held in Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd, section 163 
encompasses both past and future conduct including conduct that is not being persisted with. The conduct 
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complained of may be a repeated act or omission and may be enduring, hence why an applicant would be 
permitted to bring an application for ongoing conduct.  
An act or omission of the company or a related company includes the resolutions of the board of directors and 
the acts of the board of directors. It also includes the acts of an individual who has been authorised by the 
board or to whom the powers of the board have been delegated. An act or omission of the directors may even 
amount to an act or omission of the company where it is done in breach of a duty owed to the company. The 
resolutions of shareholders in general meetings are also acts of the company.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Grancy Properties Limited v Manala had to consider whether or not the 
appellant had in fact established a right to the relief sought in the lower court.99 The conduct complained of 
under this case was, among others, breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation and abuse of company assets 
and funds as well as denying the appellant its rights as a shareholder. Further, interests that are unfairly 
prejudiced must result in commercial unfairness affecting the applicant in such capacity.100 It is not expressly 
required that the interests of the applicant should be disregarded or affected in any particular capacity.101  
As held in Grancy Properties Limited v Manala, the law pertaining to section 252 was developed through 
copious amounts of case law. There is a benefit to reviewing the jurisprudence developed over the years as 
to what may be considered oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. Reference was made to Aspek Pipe Co 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others,102 which held as follows:  
“I turn next to a consideration of what is meant by conduct which is oppressive, as that word is used in sec 111 
bis or sec 210 of the English Act. Many definitions of the word in the context of the section have been laid 
down in decisions both of our Courts and in England and Scotland and as I feel that a proper appreciation of 
what was intended by the Legislature in affording relief to shareholders who complain that the affairs of a 
company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to them is basic to the issue which presently lies for 
decision by me, it is necessary to attempt to extract from such definitions a formulation of such intention. 
Oppressive conduct has been defined as unjust or harsh or tyrannical . . . or burdensome, harsh and wrongful 
. . . or which involves at least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing . . . or a visible departure from the 
standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts 
his money to a company is entitled to rely. . . . ‘(T)yrannical’ conduct represents a higher degree of oppression 
than conduct which is ‘harsh’ or ‘unjust’. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines ‘tyrannical’ as ‘severely 
oppressive; despotically harsh or cruel’. For reasons which I shall now set out I do not think it is necessary for 
an applicant to have to go to the lengths of establishing conduct of such a nature before he is entitled to relief 
under sec 111 bis.”  
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The determination established in Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others has also 
been reiterated in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer, 103 which held that “the concept of 
'oppressive' denotes conduct that is 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful' and that such conduct would include 
lack of probity or good faith and fair dealing in the affairs of a company, to the prejudice of some portion of its 
members”. 
In providing an answer as to what constitutes oppressive conduct, the court held that in the past the term had 
been defined as, amongst others, “unjust, harsh or tyrannical”, “burdensome, harsh and wrongful”, “involving 
at least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing”, or “a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing 
and a violation of the conditions of fair play” (Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (c)525H 
– 526E).104 The court in this case concluded that an applicant seeking relief against “oppressive” conduct 
should not go to the extent of proving that the conduct complained of was tyrannical. In the previous section 
of 252 and section 111,105 the test for the determination of oppressive was said to be primarily subjective.106 
In the South African case of Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transavaal Collieries Ltd: 
SA Mutual Life Assurance Society and Another Intervening, the court held that in order to succeed under s 
252 an applicant had to establish ‘A lack if probity or fair dealing, or a visible depature from the standards of 
fair dealing, or a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder is entitled to rely’.107 
The test, according to Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd,108 is whether the acts or 
omissions that unfairly prejudiced the applicant’s interests affected the applicant in his capacity as a 
shareholder. The precise question is whether the harm suffered by the applicant is something the applicant is 
entitled to be protected from.109  
5. CONCLUSION  
At the core of the governance of an entity is ultimately the rule of the majority prevailing.110 The democracy 
underlying the governance of the company is premised on each shareholder, director or prescribed officer 
having a right to vote, and the exercise of that right determines the direction upon which the company shall 
proceed. Thus, the presence of the remedy for oppressive or prejudicial conduct constitutes a flexible 
mechanism for the protection of minority shareholders and directors.111 It departs to some extent from the 
general principle of judicial non-intervention in corporate management.  
Accordingly, the oppression remedy has undergone a wide change from what it was in section 252, to what it 
is today in section 163. The limitations that confined the application of the oppression remedy to oppressive 
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conduct in the former, have been broadened rather extensively in the latter’s application which has therefore 
rendered this remedy much more inclusive than its previous section. The changes are also reflected through 
the introduction of the term “interest” which garners a vast improvement from the previous section which only 
limited the oppression remedy to the holders of shares.  
What the oppression remedy has failed to do however is to provide for the type of action/mechanisms to be 
relied upon in determining unfair, prejudicial or oppressive conduct, instead it opens up the flood gates for 
directors or shareholders to consistently inundate the courts with applications for acts that they believe could 
be unfair, prejudicial or oppressive. This then leaves the commercial business decisions in the hands of the 
judiciary who may not be the best equipped to make such a decision as to what shall be necessary 
commercially viable for the business. The authors of the Companies Act should consider adding to section 163 
as it is, mechanisms and or scenarios in which an act or omission could be considered unfair, prejudicial or 
oppressive and not just necessarily leave it to the discretion of the applicant and ultimately the judiciary. I opine 
that the true purpose of section 163 is to protect the shareholders, directors and the business whilst 
considering, optimally what is best for the business commercially, as it is after all, a business.  
At the helm of the application of section 163 is the determination of locus standi. The importance of determining 
the locus standi lies in the assistance and clarity it provides an applicant by providing them with knowledge as 
to whether they can satisfy the requirements as laid out by the Companies Act to bring forth to the court an 
application and under which relevant section can such aforesaid application be brought. In its simplified form 
the relatedness between two juristic entities is determined by the control exercised by one entity over the other. 
Despite the mechanisms to determine control are set out in section 2 (2) of the Companies Act, its in this case 
of De Klerk v Ferreira,112 where the courts had to grapple with the concept of de facto control over an entity. 
As provided for above, control has been extended beyond the normal confines of corporate governs which 
normally encapsulates holding the majority or controlling share, in this particular instant control is in the context 
of a minority shareholder controlling the entity.  
Despite the South African judiciary not having had much interface with section 163, its application shall remain 
one where the judges will be required to tread carefully due to the wide powers of discretion conferred upon 
the judges in reaching a judgement. In applying section 163, the judiciary will always encounter difficulties in 
determining prejudicial and oppressive conduct as there is now a wide and almost all encompassing threshold 
to consider and as a result of this there will never be a straight formula to which the judiciary may place reliance 
on.  The judiciary will need to, in the interpretation and implementation of section 163 ensure that they are 
adhering to the objective the legislature intended to achieve with the aforementioned improvements as laid out 
in section 163. In doing so the judiciary should seek guidance from countries such as Canada in which the 
oppression remedy has been developed and applied successfully. 
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